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I. INTRODUCTION 
South Korea's economic development since the 1960s has been 
phenomenal. Devastated by the Korean War (1950-1953), South 
Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1950s. 
Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was a mere $1.5 billion and per 
capita GDP was only $70 in 1954. Starting in 1962 with a five-year 
economic plan, however, South Korea initiated industrialization to 
develop the economy. Through the implementation of several 
more five-year economic plans, South Korea now has the 13th larg-
est economy in the world. Its national GDP in 2007 was $949.7 
billion and GDP per capita reached $19,624. This rapid develop-
ment is unprecedented in world history. 
Although South Korea enjoyed the miraculous economic de-
velopment in the past several decades, it also went through political 
and economic upheavals during the same time period. After the 
assassination of President PARK Chung-hee in 1979, a military dic-
tator who orchestrated South Korea's rapid economic development, 
the Korean people were expecting a democratic government. How-
ever, that expectation was completely destroyed by another military 
dictatorship under CHUN Doo-hwan. To make matters worse, the 
Korean economy faced its first potential crisis in 1980 during the 
second global oil shock. Although the Chun administration over-
came these difficulties, anti-government and political activist moves 
for democratization escalated. 
In 1987, South Korea held its first direct presidential election in 
nearly 30 years. Despite the fact that President ROH Tae-woo, a 
hand-picked successor of previous dictator CHUN Doo-whan, was 
elected, the event symbolized the transition to democracy. Since 
then, civilian leaders have been elected as president and two power 
transitions have occurred. The first occurred when the conservative 
party lost to the liberal party in two recent presidential terms and 
the presidency has since gone back to the conservative party in the 
recent election last year. 
This democratization has had many positive effects on Korean 
politics and society, such as human rights improvement, a better 
reflection of public opinion in policymaking, fair elections, as well 
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as freedom of speech. Yet, it also had some potentially negative 
effects as well. For example, the legalization of labor unions en-
hanced labor rights but also led to wage hikes, which resulted in 
decreased exports. Moreover, frequent labor-management disputes 
led to a drastic increase in lost workdays, which contributed to the 
outbreak of the financial crisis. 
In 1997, South Korea experienced a foreign exchange crisis and 
had to be bailed out by the International Money Fund (IMF). Al-
though South Korea graduated from the IMF bailout program 
faster than expected, the Korean economy has not been able to get 
back to the pace it used to enjoy prior to the crisis. For example, 
the South Korean economy is expected to grow in 2008 by 4.9 per-
cent.1 While this expected growth rate is not bad compared to 
other countries, the Korean people are used to double-digit growth. 
Thus the focus of last presidential election was on getting the econ-
omy back on track. 
In this paper, we examine the political economy of South Ko-
rea to explain the factors that contributed to the miraculous eco-
nomic development as well as the cause of the financial crisis in 
1997 which occurred during the period of transition to democracy. 
When South Korea enjoyed high rates of growth, political freedom 
was constrained and human rights were abused. However, after the 
transition to democracy, the Korean economy struggled and even-
tually experienced a financial crisis. Thus, we discuss the process of 
political and economic development in South Korea to draw lessons 
for other countries. 
II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE 
AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT: THE PARK 
CHUNG-HEE ADMINISTRATION 
A. The Statist Approach 
Previous studies on South Korea's economic development have 
provided a number of theoretical explanations, but one of the most 
dominant theoretical frameworks is the government-led develop-
ment paradigm, so called the statist approach.2 According to this 
I. Moreover, 17 percent of labor population between the age of 15 and 29 is unem-
ployed (OECD, 2007). "Jobs for Youth: Korea,'· Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD). 2007. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/28/ 
39797189.pdf (viewed on April 23, 2008). 
2. Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, 
New York, NW: Oxford University Press. 1992, p.79. Peter Evans. Dietrich Rues· 
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approach, state (government) autonomy is a crucial factor in suc-
cessful economic performance because government is the entity 
that designs and implements economic policies.3 State autonomy is 
particularly important when policy shifts occur because new incen-
tives that drive the policy shifts may lead to a new growth coalition 
and different winners and losers.4 
Although state autonomy is important, cooperation between 
government and dominant social forces, such as chaebol in South 
Korea, is also crucial.5 The reason is that dominant social forces 
often seek to affect economic policy-making to have their own in-
terests reflected while the state seeks to reinforce its autonomy to 
implement effective industrialization policies.6 The collaborative 
relationship between the government and the private sector, com-
plete with its economic growth, was also needed to offset the lack of 
chemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, New York, NW: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, pp. 44-72. Heo, Uk and Sunwoong Kim, "Financial Crisis in 
South Korea: Failure of the Government-led Development Paradigm," Asian Survey, 
Vol. 40 (2000), pp. 492-507. Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and 
the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1990, p. 24. 
3. According to Caporaso and Levine (1992), state autonomy denotes "the ability 
of the state to define and pursue an agenda not defined for it solely by private social 
interests." J.A. Caporaso and David P. Levine, Theories of Political Economy, New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 181. 
4. Stephan Haggard, "Review: The Newly Industrializing Countries in the Interna-
tional System," World Politics, Vol. 38 (1986), pp. 343-370. 
5. Chaebol refer to gigantic business conglomerates in South Korea. With the gov-
ernment-led development approach, the Seoul government gave a preferential treat-
ment to export-oriented corporations with respect to credit allocation. As a result, 
some family owned companies grew to become huge business corporations dealing with 
various industries. The close working relationship between the government and the 
business community played a significant role in developing the Korean economy. See 
Yeon-Ho Lee, The State, Society, and Big Business in South Korea, London: Routledge 
Advances in Asia-Pacific Business, 1997, pp. 18-28. However, the close relationship be-
tween the government and private sector is often regarded as a source of corruption 
and one of the causes of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. See Uk Heo. "South Korea: 
Democratization. Financial Crisis, and the Decline of the Developmental State" In 
Shale Horowitz and Uk Heo, eds., The political Economy of International Financial 
Crisis: Interest Groups, Ideologies, and Institutions, Lanham. MA: Rowman and Little-
field, 2001, pp. 151-164; and Uk Heo and Alexander C. Tan, "Democracy and Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries: A Causal Analysis." Comparative Politics, Vol. 33, 
No.4 (July 2002), pp.463-473. Neal Jesse, Uk Heo, and Karl DeRouen Jr., "A Nested 
Game Approach to Political and Economic Liberalization in Democratizing States: The 
Case of South Korea" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3 (September 200), 
pp. 401-422. 
6. Stephan Haggard and Chung-In Moon. "Institutions and Economic Policy: The-
ory and A Korean Case,'' World Politics, Vol. 42 (1990): pp. 210-237. 
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political legitimacy of the authoritarian regimes. The Governm~nt 
maintained stability through its economic success and by shanng 
the benefits of their newfound economic success with the dominant 
social and economic forces. 7 Thus, Peter Evans asserts that govern-
ment had to be "embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds 
the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the 
continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies."8 
B. Export-Oriented Industrialization 
Although the South Korean government actively intervened in 
the economy to protect domestic industries, their intervention was 
also designed to lead the economy to be competitive in interna-
tional markets.9 Thus, White and Wade argue that the ultimate ob-
jective of the Korean government was liberalizing the economy to 
be able to compete in international markets. 10 This direction was 
manifested in the export-oriented industrialization strategy pursued 
by the government. 
In 1962, the Korean government launched the first five-year 
economic plan. As U.S. aid was declining, the plan focused on 
transforming the economy from being foreign aid dependent to be-
coming independent. To this end, the government provided assis-
tance to basic industries and invested in the improvement of social 
and economic infrastructure, which was critical for economic devel-
opment. In other words, with the first five-year economic plan, the 
government aimed to improve the foundation of the economy 
before the initiation of export-oriented industrialization policy. 
After the first economic development plan was completed in 
1967, increasing exports became the keynote of the second five-year 
development plan.11 The government planned on fostering indus-
tries for both export promotion and import-substitution, although 
7. Danny M.Leipziger, Lessons from East Asia, Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1997, p. 235. 
8. Peter B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1995, p. 12. 
9. According to Lee (1985), the open economy system took root through the sec-
ond development plan structurally. Jung-Bock Lee, "Industrialization and the Changes 
of Political System," Han-gook-jung-chi-hock-hoi (The Korean Political Science Associ-
ation), Vol. 19 (1985), pp. 61-75. 
10. Gorden White and Robert Wade, "Development; States and Markets in East 
Asia: An Introduction," in Gorden White, ed., Developmental States in East Asia, New 
York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1988, p. 182. 
11. Ho-Jin Kim, Han-gook-jung-chi Che-ju-ron (The Theory of Korean Politics), 
Seoul: Park-Young Sa, 1990, p. 135. 
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import-substitution was designed mainly to support the material 
supply required for manufacturing exporting goods. Due to the 
lack of capital and advanced technology, the government initially 
promoted labor-intensive light industries for export. As the econ-
omy grew with the increase in exports, the government gradually 
moved its focus from light industries to heavy-chemical industries. 
The export-oriented industrialization policy had two meaning-
ful effects. First, import substitution of light industrial goods was 
almost completed by the end of the 1960s, and the quality of the 
products had reached international standards_IZ Second, export-
oriented industrialization had a significant impact on the industrial 
structure. Prior to the policy, primary industry, especially agricul-
ture, was the major industry in Korea. For example, the agriculture 
industry accounted for between 40-50 percent of the total industrial 
structure in Korea until the early 1960's. The second industry, such 
as manufacturing, made up mere 10-20 percent. However, by the 
late 1960's, both types of industries had balanced out, and each of 
them accounted for approximately 30 percent of the industrial 
structure. 
Starting in the early 1970's, the government started pushing for 
Heavy Chemical Industrialization (HCI). With the 3rd five-year ec-
onomic development plan (1972-1976), the government appointed 
nonferrous metals, petrochemicals, general-type machinery, ship-
building, and electronics as five strategic fields. Since HCI was ex-
pensive and risky, the dependency of business on the government 
for credit allocation increased. As a result, the government-busi-
ness ties deepened. 
C. Control of the Financial Sector and the Government-
Business Ties 
To implement the export-oriented growth policy, the Korean 
government made two policy moves: 1) control the financial sector 
to provide preferential treatment of export-oriented industries and 
to increase domestic savings; and 2) manage the exchange rate to 
stabilize exports. To this end, the Korean government purchased 
bank stocks and publicly owned the main banks, which provided 
two benefits: 1) it buttressed the state autonomy; and 2) gave it 
power over credit allocation. To fully exercise its power of credit 
allocation, in September 1965, the government announced a law 
12. Bohn-Ho Koo, Han-gook-gyung-je-ui Yeok-sa-jeok Jo-Myung (The Historical 
Approach on Korean Economy), Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1991, p. 188. 
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that limited interest rates. According to Haggard, Kim, and Moon, 
this reform policy was one of the locomotives that contributed to 
South Korea's economic growth.U With this policy, the Korean 
government aimed to move a significant amount of capital from the 
private money market to banks by controlling the unrealistic inter-
est rates of the private money market and then raising the interest 
rates of savings account. In addition, the government intended to 
increase domestic savings to create an important source of domestic 
investment. The policy worked and savings rates consistently in-
creased over time. For instance, in the 1960s the average personal 
savings share of GDP was only 1 to 2 percent, but by the 1970's it 
had increased to 7 percent.14 
In addition, the Korean government aggressively managed the 
exchange rate to maintain the value of the Korean currency, won, 
without much fluctuation. The won was kept devaluated to pro-
mote exports. Some scholars point out that the effect of exchange 
rate management was limited due to the large proportion of im-
ports of raw materials or was irrelevant because of heavy subsidies 
and coerciveness on exports.15 However, a deliberately maintained 
realistic exchange rate "provided an incentive to export and sus-
tained the price stability of imported materials."16 
III. ANOTHER AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT: THE 
CHUN DOO-WHAN ADMINISTRATION 
On October 26, 1979, President PARK Chung-hee was assassi-
nated by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) director, 
KIM Jae-kyu. The death of President Park brought about confu-
sion and instability due to the power vacuum caused by the elimina-
tion of an absolute ruler that had governed the country for nearly 
two decades. Against the Korean people's hope to have a demo-
cratic government, Major General CHUN Doo-whan came to 
power. Thousands of people went out to the streets to protest 
against the Chun government. On May 18, 1980 in Kwangju, there 
was a massive demonstration by college students and private citi-
13. Stephan Haggard, Byung-Kook Kim, and Chung-In Moon, "The Transition to 
Export•led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 50 
(1991), pp. 850-873. 
14. Leipziger, Lessons from East Asia, supra note 4, p. 169. 
15. Amsden. Asia's Next Giant, supra note 3, pp. 65-67. 
1?. Su?g Deuk Hahm ~nd Uk H.eo, "The Economic Effects of US and Japanese 
Fore1gn D1rect Investment m East As1a: A Comparative Analysis," Policy Studies Jour-
nal, Vol.36 (2008): 
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zens asking for democracy. The government sent troops and sup-
pressed the protest by force, which resulted in approximately 200 
deaths and 800 injuries. As a result, the CHUN Doo-whan govern-
ment constantly faced anti-government protests despite the fact 
that he was elected president by the electoral college in 1981. 
Before the election, a constitutional amendment passed which lim-
ited the presidential term as a non-renewable, single term of 7 
years. 
As soon as President Chun took office, his administration 
faced a number of serious economic problems. Due to the second 
oil shock in 1979, inflation was high and was threatening the econ-
omy. The policy efforts by the previous government to reduce in-
flation were not successful due to the intense investment in the 
heavy chemical industry (HCI). The economic structure was based 
on big business conglomerates (chaebol), which was causing 
problems in the economic structural as well as an unequal distribu-
tion of wealth. To make matters worse, the international economic 
environment was not friendly to Korean exports either. The second 
oil shock brought on an international recession, which gave rise to 
protectionism in many countries. To confront with these problems, 
the Chun administration adopted aggressive policy measures to 
continue to develop the economy in order to compensate for the 
lack of political legitimacy. We explain each of them next. 
A. Inflation Control 
Since the PARK Chung-hee administration mainly focused on 
growth, there were inflation pressures. In the late 1970s, inflation 
reached a dangerous level due to the second oil shock and the 
heavy and chemical industrial drive. Although the Park Adminis-
tration recognized the seriousness of inflation, their policy re-
sponse, such as the 4.17 Policies for Stability,17 was not limited 
because Park did not want to slow down growth or the HCI drive. 
17. The Policies for Economic Stability, also called the 4. 17 Policies, which were 
announced on April17, were first implemented in 1979 under the Park Administration. 
These policies mainly consist of seven parts: first, currency management; second, reduc-
ing the fiscal deficit; third, liberalizing imports; fourth, reforming the price system ac-
cording to market economy; fifth, stabilizing wages: sixth, controlling investments in 
HCI: seventh, stabilizing the price of real estate (Lee 2003). Hyung-Goo Lee. Jo-se Je-
jung-jung-check 0-sheep-nyun Jeung-un mit Jung-check Pyung-ga (The Record and 
Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policies for 50 years), Seoul: Korean Institute of Public 
Finance. 2003, p. 52. 
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The Chun Administration, however, was different. The gov-
ernment placed emphasis on reducing inflation to acquire socio-ec-
onomic stability. In addition, the Chun government realized that 
continued inflation might reduce South Korea's international com-
petitiveness, which would slow down exports and, eventually, 
growth. Thus, controlling inflation became one of the main policy 
objectives of the Chun Administration.18 To combat it, the govern-
ment adopted a tight fiscal policy, such as a government expendi-
ture freeze in 1984, raising interest rates, and reducing credit. 19 The 
budget deficit was also reduced by 39 percent by 1985.20 A report 
by the Bank of Korea describes the period of the Chun administra-
tion as "a period of stability of prices." 
B. Economic Restructuring 
In addition to inflation control efforts, the Chun administration 
attempted to overhaul the economic structure to enhance stability. 
To this end, the Chun government tried to reduce the dependence 
of the economy on big business conglomerates (chaebol) and heavy 
chemical industries with the Policies for Restraining Economic Cen-
tralization in 1980. This policy was meaningful because its ap-
proach was to restructure the existing Korean economy. After this 
policy was adopted, the government stepped up its efforts to dis-
tribute more resources to medium and small size enterprises. 
Another policy effort by the Chun administration was "rear-
ranging businesses" to improve the overall effectiveness of the na-
tional economy. Due to the government-led development 
approach, some industries, such as shipping and construction heav-
ily relied on the government in the 1970s.Z1 Although these busi-
nesses were supported by the government through investment and 
favorable tax policies, they failed to overcome the hurdles 
presented to them by the new international economic environments 
in the 1980s. These included a global recession, increased protec-
tionism in developed countries, and international pressures for Ko-
18. Jung-Gil Chung, Dae-Tong-Ryung-ui Kyung-je Leadership (President's Eco-
nomic Leadership). Seoul: The Korea Economic Daily. 1994, p. 146. 
19. Staphan Haggard and Chung-In Moon. "Institutions and Economic Policy: The-
ory and A Korean Case," World Politics, Vol. 42 (1990), pp. 210-237. 
20. Ibid., Haggard and Moon (1990) also pointed out that the effort for fiscal re-
straint was particularly impressive. since the average annual growth rates of govern-
ment spending between 1962 and 1979 had been 28 percent. p. 222. 
21. Korean Economic Research Institute. Han-guk-ui Gee-eup-jeep-dan (Korean 
Kombinat). Korean Economic Research Institute, 2005, p. 212. 
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rea to revalue their currency. The government, therefore, selected 
unprofitable businesses and liquidated them through acquisition (50 
companies), merger (17 companies), and legal management (1 com-
pany). Until 1988, the number of those reorganized businesses had 
reached 70.22 
In addition, the Chun Administration avoided direct govern-
ment intervention in the economy by cutting down or removing tax 
policies designed to support specific export-oriented industries. In-
stead, the government put more emphasis on improving business 
environment and economic infrastructures. 
The Chun government also changed the credit allocation poli-
cies by introducing a cap on credit that can be assigned to one 
chaebol. The new policy also required a government's approval 
before a chaebol invested in a new business. This measure was to 
help correct the unfair relationship between big firms and small 
businesses. 23 
C. Effects of New Economic Policies 
Policies adopted by the Chun administration to control infla-
tion worked. Moreover, with the changed role of the government 
in credit allocation and the economy in general, the Korean econ-
omy got back on the track and resumed its rapid growth. The aver-
age growth rate during the Chun Administration (1981-1987) was 
8.7 percent and the national GDP reached $100 billion. Considering 
that the growth rate of 1980 was -1.5 percent, the new policies to 
deal with economic problems worked effectively. As Evans, Rues-
chemeyer, and Skocpol pointed out, some economic policy mea-
sures adopted by the Chun administration were only possible 
because of its strong autonomy of the state.24 Also, it should be 
noted that the "three lows" in economic conditions-low oil prices, 
low interest rates, and low exchange rates-provided a friendly en-
vironment for economic recovery and growth. In summary, the 
22. Hun-Joo Park, "The Perspective of Small Business in South Korea.'· Korean 
Development Institute (KDI) School Working Paper Series 06 (13). 2006, p. 25. 
23. Yeon-Ho Lee, The State, Society, and Big Business in South Korea, London: 
Routledge Advances in Asia-Pacific Business, 1997, pp. 46-53. 
24. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State 
Back In, New York, NW: Cambridge University Press, 1985. p.l75. 
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Chun government's new economic policies gave way to other eco-
nomic take-offs in the 1980s and a more liberalized economy.Z5 
IV. DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Transition to Democracy 
Although the Chun administration was successful in bringing 
the economy back around, protests for democracy increased due to 
the administration's human rights abuse and authoritarian rule. 
The movement peaked at the accidental death of a college student, 
PARK Jong-chul, which was caused by a police beating. Thousands 
of people came out to the street to protest against the Chun govern-
ment and to request a direct election for the next president. On 
June 29, 1987, the government made an announcement to give way 
to the transition to democracy, which included: 1) a direct election 
of the president; 2) a guarantee of human rights; 3) guarantees of 
freedom of speech; 4) local autonomy; and 5) securing freedom of 
political parties.26 With 93 percent support for the direct presiden-
tial election in a referendum, the constitutional amendment to 
change the presidential election process was promulgated on Octo-
ber 29, 1987.27 
The June 29 announcement also included the pardon of KIM 
Dae-Jung, a life-long opposition leader, which enabled him to join 
the presidential race in 1987. KIM Young-Sam, a political rival of 
KIM Dae-Jung, was also determined to run for presidency.28 Since 
the running of both candidates would split the votes and reduce the 
chance for electing a civilian president, the two Kims-KIM Dae-
jung and KIM Young-sam-attempted to have a single candidate, 
but failed. As a result, the direct presidential election resulted in 
the victory by the governing party's candidate, ROH Tae-woo with 
25. Dahl-Joong Chang. "Kyung-je-sung-jang-gwa jung-chi-byun-dong (Economic 
Growth and Political Transition)." In Korean Politics-Issues and Tasks, ed. The Korean 
Political Science Association. Seoul: Bobmunsa, 1993, p. 80. 
26. Hyun-Sheup Kim, Witaehan chokuk Konsolae pijanghan kakoh (The grim 
promise to build the great father land), Kyunghyang sinmun, June 29, 1987, p. 3. 
27. Larry Diamond and Doh-chull Shin, "Institutional Reform and Democratic 
Consolidation in Korea," Larry Diamond and Doh-chull Shin ed .. Institutional Reform 
and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press 
2000, p.6. ' 
28. John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999, 
pp. 98-101. 
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36.6 percent of votes while KIM Young-Sam and KIM Dae-Jung 
received 28 and 27.1 percent respectively.Z9 
Despite the fact that President ROH Tae-woo was elected 
through the popular election, his administration's legitimacy was 
still questioned because of his military background and the support 
provided by the previous authoritarian leader, CHUN Doo-whan. 
Moreover, the National Assembly's audit found serious evidence of 
corruption by President CHUN Doo-whan and the opposition party 
pressured to indict him. Thus, the Roh administration attempted to 
separate itself from the legacy of Chun's authoritarian regime, how-
ever it was without much success. 
Due to President Rob's unpopularity, the opposition party en-
joyed the majority in the National Assembly, which caused difficul-
ties for the new administration to pass policy resolutions. To 
correct the situation, President Rob approached the two opposition 
leaders, KIM Young-sam, and KIM Jong-pil, which resulted in a 
three party merger on Jan 22, 1990. The party merger helped not 
only the ROH Tae-woo administration to pass policy resolutions in 
the National Assembly but it also helped KIM Young-sam to be-
come the governing party's candidate in the next presidential 
election. 
On December 18, 1992, KIM Young-sam was elected to be-
come the first civilian president selected through a direct election. 
To have complete control over the military, President KIM Young-
sam purged the members of the Hanahoe, an inner circle organiza-
tion with specific political orientation which was secretly organized 
by CHUN Doo-hwan in 1963. The Hanahoe members enjoyed 
domination in key military positions and entered into politics once 
General CHUN became president. To politically neutralize the 
military, President Kim retired all the Hanahoe members from the 
military. 
President KIM Young-sam also reopened the corruption case 
of Presidents CHUN Doo-whan and ROH Tae-woo by declaring 
the "judgment of history" on June 3, 1993. CHUN Doo-whan was 
sentenced to life in prison and ROH Tae-woo was sentenced seven-
teen years in prison for the military coup on December 12, 1979, the 
brutal suppression of the Kwangju uprising on May 18, 1980, and 
embezzlement. 
29. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The political economy of democratic 
transitions, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p95. 
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The KIM Young-sam administration also adopted local aut?n-
omy to further democratize the political system. With the adoptiOn 
of local autonomy, the KIM Young-sam administration reduced t~e 
central government's involvement in local policy making. Thts 
change made significant contributions to democracy in South 
Korea. 
V. ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE UNDER DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 
A. The ROH Tae-woo Administration 
The ROH Tae-woo administration's emphasis on equity and 
balance enhanced the social welfare system through housing poli-
cies and a national health care plan.30 To supply more homes, the 
government adopted a policy to construct two million new housing 
units. To this end, an annual average of two hundred thousand 
homes were built. The national health plan adopted by the PARK 
Chung-hee administration was also expanded to include people in 
the lower income brackets and the minimum wage law was adopted 
to assist in the redistribution of wealth. 
However, the public investment to improve social welfare ag-
gravated the balance of payments. To make matters worse, the 
trade deficit caused by a surge in imports led to an economic de-
cline. In addition, the number of labor unions and labor-manage-
ment disputes increased significantly. For example, the number of 
labor unions rose by 19.5 percent in 1988 followed by 19.8 percent 
in 1989.31 Labor unions organized strikes to raise wages when la-
bor-management disputes occurred. The ROH Tae-woo adminis-
tration, however, decided not to intervene, which led to the 
increases in lost worker productivity especially in the early period 
of the Roh administration (1987-1989). 
The frequent strikes eventually led to wage increases for labor 
workers. The average income of labor workers grew by 10 percent 
in 1987, 15.5 percent in 1988, and 21.1 percent in 1989. The rapid 
income growth resulted in higher rates of inflation, a loss of interna-
30. Seong-Ryeul Cho, "Economic Reform and National Strategic Change of the 
Roh Tae-woo administration," Hankuk jungchi hakhaebo (Korea Political Science As-
sociation Review), Vol. 30, No. 2 (1996), p 196. 
31. Seong-Jae Cho and Jung-Woo Kim, Hankukui nosakwan'gye byonhwa ch'uyi 
bunsok mit saeroun nosachongch'aek panghyang (The analysis of the relation between 
labor and manager and new direction of labor and manager policy), Gwach'on: Ministry 
of Labor, 2007, p. 33. 
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tional competitiveness, and slower economic growth. For example, 
between 1987 and 1989, the average wage of labor workers in South 
Korea went up by 46.6 percent whereas it increased by only 0.1 per-
cent and 9.8 percent in the U.S. and Japan respectively. This differ-
ence in wage increases significantly reduced South Korea's 
international competitiveness.32 As a result, Korea's economic 
growth rate dropped to 6.4 percent in 1989 from 11.5 percent in the 
previous year. Given that the average growth rate for 1985-1990 
was 14.4 percent, this was a significant decline in economic growth. 
Thus, President Roh vetoed a labor reform bill in 1989 that favored 
labor unions. However, the labor sector continued to put pressure 
on the Roh government especially after South Korea joined the 
United Nations on September 19, 1991 and the International Labor 
organization on December 9, 1991.33 
Table 1. Labor-management Dispute Status 
Years 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Labor Dispute 3,749 1,873 1,616 322 234 235 144 Figures (cases) 
Days not worked 
by economic 6946935 5400836 6351400 4487200 3257600 1527600 130830( 
activity 
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO), LABORSTA- database of labour statistics 
(http://laborsta.ilo.org/). 
Ministry of labor of South Korea, Hankukai nosakwan'gye by6nhwa ch'uvi buns6k mit saer-
oun nosach6ngch'aek panghyang (The analysis of the relation between labor and manager and 
new direction of labor and manager policy), Gwach'on: Ministry of Labor, 2007, pp. 18-19. 
Table 2. Income Growth Rates 
Years 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Wage Growth(%) 9.2 8.2 10.1 15.5 21.1 18.8 17.5 15.2 12.2 12.7 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Maew61 nodong t'onggye chosa bogos6 (labor statistics monthly 
report), from 1985 to 1994. 
32. Won-dok Lee,J987nyon ihu hankukui nodong undong (Labor Movement in Ko-
rea after 1987), Seoul: Korea Labor Institute, 2000, p. 15. 
33. Young-ki Choi, Gwang-seuk Jeon, and Cheul-su Lee, Bum-sang Ryu, 87nyon 
ihu nodongbOpjeiii byonch'onyon: bOpchejong mit chOngch'aek byonhwaiii yiJksa (The 
changes of labor law after'S?: the history of law establishment and policy change), 
Gwacheon: Ministry of Labor, 1999, pp. 79-132. 
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Table 3. Inflation 
Years 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Inflation(%) 3.07 7.14 5.68 8.56 9.34 6.23 4.79 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world Economic Outlook(WEO) Database 
April 1999, Inflation 
(http://www .imf.org/ externaUpu bs/ft/weo/ 1999/01 I data/index.h tm) 
B. The KIM Young-sam Administration 
The KIM Young-sam administration began liberalizing the 
economy through deregulation and a decrease in government inter-
vention. The Kim administration decided not to investigate ram-
pant corruption coming from the financial institution's lending 
practice. Traditionally, there was a close tie between politicians, 
government officials, and businessman. Politicians/government offi-
cials pressured banks to give loans to export oriented businesses, 
especially chaebol, and chaebol made illegal campaign contributions 
to politicians in return. 
To cut the politics-business ties and make financial transactions 
transparent, the KIM Young-sam administration adopted the real-
name financial transaction policy. Prior to the adoption of the pol-
icy, the South Korean government implicitly admitted false name 
financial transactions to increase savings and money circulation. 
However, false name accounts were commonly used to avoid capi-
tal gain taxes as well as in money laundering schemes. 
Another policy adopted by the Kim administration related to 
the real-name financial transaction system was the real-name prop-
erty ownership. The implementation of the policy started with the 
financial disclosure of high-ranking public officials. This initial step 
was meaningful because the use of false names for real estate own-
ership was common. This alias or borrowing of another person's 
name was commonly used to avoid capital gain taxes for sales or 
inheritance of real estate properties. 
In addition, to join the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), the KIM Young-sam administra-
tion pushed economic policies, which included the liberalization of 
the foreign exchange rate, foreign direct investment, and insurance. 
These policies led to an increase in foreign capital flow, which was 
followed by the rise of mercantile banks or quasi-financial compa-
nies to handle the foreign capital. However, these new financial 
16 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
institutions lacked experience in dealing with foreign capital which 
was partially to blame for the cause of the financial crisis in 1997.34 
The Kim administration also introduced a labor reform bill to 
change the labor-management relationship. The bill included three 
important changes: 1) legalization of layoffs by the management; 2) 
flexible work hours; and 3) laborer reform to improve the efficiency 
of the labor structure.35 The bill faced strong opposition and stalled 
in the National Assembly. 
C. The 1997 Financial Crisis 
Starting in the mid-1990s, South Korea showed signs of eco-
nomic trouble. By June 1997, foreign debt by Korean banks had 
reached 24 percent of the gross national product. What made the 
debt even riskier was the amount of short-term debt, which was 
approximately 350 percent of their foreign exchange reserves. 
Moreover, the average debt-equity ratio of the thirty largest busi-
ness conglomerates (chaebol) was almost 400 percent. Considering 
that the average debt-equity ratio of large U.S. firms is a mere 70 
percent, the financial structure of the Korean chaebol was seriously 
problematic. 36 
What led to the rather sudden rise of international debt? Ac-
cording to Demetriades and Fattouh,37 "[F]inancial liberalization 
and tight monetary policy, which kept domestic interest rates above 
world interest rates, encouraged commercial and merchant banks to 
rely heavily on cheaper foreign credit-perceived to be cheaper be-
cause of the pegged exchange rate." Since there was no prudential 
supervision system over international lending practices, short-term 
borrowing was enhanced. 
The high rates of short-term loans and international debt along 
with the low level of political involvement and economic control did 
not allow the Kim administration to make proper adjustment 
before the financial problems became uncontrollable, which even-
tually led to a serious foreign exchange problem. Exchange rates 
34. Jung Kim, "The political logic of economic crisis in South Korea," Asian Survey, 
VoL 45, No. 3 (2005), pp. 468-469. 
35. Song-tokYom, Nosa daerip sae bulssi I chongni haeko diing 3jae nollan (the 
tinderbox of antagonism between labor and manager), Kukmin llbo, July 3, 1996, p. 3. 
36. Henry Laurence, "Financial system reform and the currency crisis in East Asia," 
Asian Survey, VoL 39, No. 2 (March-April 1999), p. 363. 
37. Panicos 0. Demetriades and Bassam A. Fattouh, "The South Korean financial 
crisis: Competing explanations and policy lessons for financial liberalization," Interna-
tional Affairs. VoL 75, No. 4 (October 1999), p.788. 
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skyrocketed in the second half of the year, and the administration 
had to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to bail it out 
from default. What caused the financial crisis in South Korea in 
1997? There are many reasons, but one of them may be found in 
immature institutionalization of political and economic organiza-
tions which still had the legacy of the government-led development 
paradigm. During the authoritarian leadership under the statist ap-
proach, the government allocated credit to private business compa-
nies, which led to close ties between the government and private 
business companies. As a result, bribery and kickbacks were com-
mon between the government and private business companies, 
which made transparent lending practice virtually impossible. Al-
though some improvements were made thanks to the transition to 
democracy, there still was corruption in lending practice. 
Moreover, international competitiveness declined as the price 
of exporting Korean goods rose significantly. Since labor unions 
were legalized after the transition to democracy, the labor-manage-
ment disputes often led to labor strikes, which reduced productivity 
and worsened the financial structure of the business companies. 
The management of private business companies, however, was not 
able to lay off labor workers due to labor unions. Thus, the Kim 
administration attempted to address these issues through a labor 
reform bill and a financial reform bill. However the bills stalled in 
the National Assembly due to the president's lame duck status and 
the incorporation of the opposition parties. 
D. The KIM Dae-jung Administration: Post Crisis Reform 
Policies 
Although President KIM Dae-jung won the presidential elec-
tion by a 1.6 percent margin, the KIM Dae-Jung administration was 
in a better position to implement labor and financial reform than 
the KIM Young-sam administration. Moreover, the policy prescrip-
tion by the IMF strongly recommended the Kim government 
restructure chaebol and ill-performing financial institutions.38 Thus, 
the Kim government privatized most publicly owned banks. In ad-
dition, the government attracted foreign capital to save struggling 
companies. 
The IMF recommended high rates of interest and tax increases 
along with cutbacks on government expenditures. Following the 
38. Tong Whan Park, "South Korea in 1997: Clearing the last hurdle to political-
economic maturation,'' Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 1997). pp. 2-4. 
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IMP's policy prescription, the Kim government significantly raised 
interest rates, which made credit allocation extremely difficult for 
small and medium size enterprises. As a result, a number of com-
panies went bankrupt and unemployment rates rose significantly. 
Thus, this policy recommendation by the IMF was severely 
criticized. 39 
Turning to the financial sector reforms, the IMF emphasized 
that reform policies must be based on economic logic and not politi-
cal considerations. Moreover, the IMF strongly encouraged the Se-
oul government to further liberalize their markets.40 To meet the 
IMF expectations, first the KIM Dae-jung administration attempted 
to improve the institutionalization of financial transactions. To this 
end, the Kim government created two financial supervisory authori-
ties: the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Financial Su-
pervisory Service.41 These institutions monitored banks' BIS (Bank 
for International Settlements) ratio and their adherence to interna-
tional standards. In addition, the Kim government abolished the 
cap of aggregate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of Korean equi-
ties to attract more foreign direct investment.42 
Turning to corporate reform, the KIM Dae-jung government 
adopted the approach called "big deals. "43 Through this approach 
chaebol swapped weak businesses to merge into strong companies. 
When the big deal was not possible, a new company was created 
through combining the weakest businesses from chaebol. For in-
39. Panicos 0. Demetriades and Bassam A. Fattouh, "The South Korean financial 
crisis: Competing explanations and policy lessons for financial liberalization," Interna-
tional Affairs. Vol. 75, No.4 (October 1999), p.791; David A. Zalewski, "Brothers, Can 
you Spare $58 Billion? Regulatory Lessons from the South Korean Currency Crisis," 
Journal of Economic Issues, Vol.33, No. 2 (June 1999), p. 359. 
40. Henry Laurence, "Financial system reform and the currency crisis in East Asia,'' 
Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2 (March-April 1999), pp. 365-366. 
41. Kyng Suh Park, "Bank-led Corporate Restructuring." In Stephen Haggard, 
Wonhyuk Lim, and Euysung Kim ed., Economic Crisis and Corporate Restructuring in 
Korea. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 181; Jin-Wook Choi, "Regula-
tory forbearance and Financial Crisis in south Korea," Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 2 
(March-April 2002), p. 270. 
42. Jae S. Mah, "Regulatory Lessons from the South Korean Currency Crisis: Com-
ment on Zalewski." Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 36, No. 3 (September 2002), p. 
797; Uk Heo and Jung Yeop Woo, "South Korea's Experience with structural Reform: 
Lessons for other countries," Korean Social Science Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 (June 2006), 
p.11. 
43. Kyng Suh Park, "Bank-led Corporate Restructuring." In Stephen Haggard, 
Wonhyuk Lim, and Euysung Kim ed., Economic Crisis and Corporate Restructuring in 
Korea. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 181-206. 
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stance, Kia Motors was bought out by Hyundai Motors and Sam-
sung Motors was sold to Renault. Hyundai took over 
Semiconductor part of LG, and power components of Samsung 
Heavy Industries and Hyundai Industries were annexed by the Ko-
rea Heavy Industries and Construction (Hanjung).44 
To enhance the transparency of the accounting practices of 
chaebol, the government passed the Act on External Audit of Stock 
Companies that mandated them to submit annual financial re-
ports.45 Moreover, the government required that chaebol be sub-
ject to audits by a credible international accounting firm twice a 
year.46 
Finally, to make the labor market more flexible, as the IMF 
suggested, the KIM Dae-Jung administration legalized layoffs for 
necessary management. Yet, the law led to increases in the high 
rates of unemployment and brought forth the specter of more la-
bor-management dispute. Therefore, the government launched the 
Tripartite Commission of Labor, Business and Government in 1999 
to deal with the layoff related problems.47 
Another issue with the labor reform was increasing irregular 
(non-union) workers. Since the irregular workers could not join a 
labor union and did not have a guarantee of working hours nor 
benefits, the business management preferred increasing the number 
of irregular workers than regular employees. The high portion of 
irregular workers continues to be a social issue and often used as an 
excuse for labor strikes. 
44. Yoo, Seong Min, Chaebol, gwayeon wigiii jubiJminga? (Are the Chaebol in the 
Real Culprits of the Economic Crisis?) Seoul: Korea Development Institute, Bibong 
Press, 2000, pp.1-182; Uk Heo and Jung Yeop Woo, "South Korea's Experience with 
structural Reform: Lessons for other countries," Korean Social Science Journal, Vol. 33, 
No. 1 (June 2006), p.12. 
45. Jongryn Moand Chung-In Moon, "Business-Government Relations under Kim 
Dae-jung." In Stephen Haggard, Wonhyuk Lim. and Euysung Kim ed., Economic Crisis 
and Corporate Restructuring in Korea, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 
129; Uk Heo and Jung Yeop Woo, "South Korea's Experience with structural Reform: 
Lessons for other countries," Korean Social Science Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 (June 2006), 
p.12. 
46. Henry Laurence, "Financial system reform and the currency crisis in East Asia,'' 
Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2 (March-April 1999), p. 365. 
47. Florence Lowe-Lee. "Labor flexibility, a key to economic success," Korea In-
sight, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2006 (http://www.keia.com/Publications/Insight/ 
2006/september% 2006. pdf) 
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E. The ROH Moo-hyun Administration 
ROH Moo-hyun was the fourth civilian president since South 
Korea's transition to democracy. He was unexpectedly elected and 
thereby a different kind of president. The two previous civilian 
presents-KIM Young-sam and KIM Dae-jung-had been life-long 
opposition leaders with strong support from specific regions. They 
both had been democracy activists. However, President ROH 
Moo-hyun had none of these qualifications. Thus, President Roh 
was constrained only by the boundary of constitutional rights and 
did not try to control other political institutions.48 
In terms of economic performance, the South Korean economy 
recovered from the 1997 financial crisis and graduated from the 
IMF bailout program earlier than expected. Learning from the ex-
perience, the Korean government significantly increased its foreign 
exchange reserve from $20.4 billion in 1997 to $206.1 billion in 2006, 
the fifth highest in the world.49 
Despite the quick recovery from the crisis, the economy also 
revealed potential problems due to the policies adopted to stimu-
late the economy during the KIM Dae-jung administration. One of 
the main problems was credit card debt. To enhance private con-
sumption to bolster the economy, the KIM Dae-jung administration 
strongly encouraged credit card usage. This policy helped the econ-
omy grow in the short-term, but the consequences came later be-
cause the much of the growth was largely based on debt. The over 
usage of credit cards resulted in more than 3.2 million Koreans with 
bad credit ratings, which in turn led to a decrease in private con-
sumption in 2003 and 2004.50 In other words, the KIM Dae-jung 
administration's campaign to increase private consumption based 
on credit card was myopic. The reason for the adoption of this kind 
of short-sighted policy may be found in South Korea's presidential 
48. Sung Deuk Hahm and Dong Seong Lee, "Consolidation of Democracy in South 
Korea: Evaluation of the Roh Moo Hyun Administration, 2003-2008." Presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 2007, Chicago, Aug 30-
Sep 2, pp. 7-10. 
49. Mun-il Bak, "Jipyoro bon Oehanwigi 10nyon" (Economic indexes of 10 years 
after foreign exchange crisis), Seoul Sinmun, November 21, 2007, p.l8. 
50. Sung Deuk Hahm and Dong Seong Lee, "Consolidation of Democracy in South 
Korea: Evaluation of the Roh Moo Hyun Administration, 2003-2008." Presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 2007, Chicago, Aug 30-
Sep 2, p. 17; Byoung-Jik Kim, "Roh moo hyun jongbu ch'orahan kyongje songjokpyo" 
(Roh moo hyun administration's poor economic records), Munhwa llbo, January 29, 
2007, p.5. 
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system with its non-renewable, single-term for five years. Since the 
president cannot run for another term, political accountability be-
comes insignificant. Thus, presidents tend to adopt policies good 
for the short-term, leaving the following president to pay the price. 
Another economic issue that the Roh administration faced was 
reduced corporate investment. With the raised labor cost and the 
aggressive strikes by labor unions, business corporations increased 
foreign investment at the expense of declined domestic investment. 
According to Samsung Economic research Institute, the average 
annual growth rate of corporate investment for equipment was 7.8 
percent for 1990-1997, but it declined to 1.15 percent for 2000-
2005.51 
These issues resulted in sluggish economic performance. The 
average annual economic growth rate during the CHUN Doo-whan 
administration was 8.7 percent. During the ROH Tae-woo adminis-
tration, it was 8.4 percent, and it was 7.1 percent during the KIM 
Young-sam administration. However, the average annual economic 
growth rate for the KIM Dae-jung and ROH Moo-hyun administra-
tions was only 4.4 percent and 4.2 percent respectively.52 Moreo-
ver, between 2002 and 2006, the portion of the population living in 
poverty increased by 12 percent.53 Despite that, the Roh adminis-
tration significantly increased social welfare expenditures. For ex-
ample, only 17.9 percent of government expenditures were 
allocated for social welfare in 1997, but that was increased to 25.3 
percent in 2006.54 
In summary, the Roh administration had to deal with the re-
sults of the myopic policies adopted by the KIM Dae-jung adminis-
tration to quickly recover from the financial crisis. To make 
matters worse, the Roh administration increased social welfare ex-
penditures by increasing taxes to improve social wealth redistribu-
tion. As a result, corporate capital moved to foreign countries 
looking for better business environments, which in turn slowed the 
51. Yoo-young Kim, "Oehanwigi 10nyon, Kumnyung- kiop, odiinkotgwa Iriinkot" 
(10 years after foreign exchange crisis, what we lost and got in finance and businesses), 
Donga Ilbo, November 15, p.lO. 
52. Byoung-Jik Kim, "Roh moo hyun jongbu ch'orahan kyongje songjokpyo" (Roh 
moo hyun administration's poor economic records), Munhwa /lbo, January 29, 2007, 
p.5. 
53. Sung Deuk Hahm and Dong Seong Lee, "Consolidation of Democracy in South 
Korea: Evaluation of the Roh Moo Hyun Administration, 2003-2008." Presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 2007, Chicago, Aug 30 _ 
Sep 2, p. 17 
54. Ibid., footnote 26, p. 17. 
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economy. Aggressive labor unions further aggravated economic 
performance. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
South Korea's miraculous economic development along with 
that of a few other East Asian countries generated theoretical de-
bates in the political science and economics communities. The de-
bate largely focused on the government-led development paradigm 
vs. market-oriented paradigm. The debate generally concluded that 
the role of government in South Korea was critical along with the 
value of human capital. To describe the role of government in 
South Korea's economic development, we revisited the develop-
ment process and described economic policies adopted by the 
government. 
In addition, we also analyzed how the transition to democracy 
in South Korea occurred and why democratization may affect eco-
nomic performance. As Huntington noted,55 South Korea exper-
ienced two power transitions and a deepening of democracy. 
Unlike the expectation of scholars who argue that democracy helps 
economic growth,56the initial economic performance of democratic 
governments in South Korea was rather poor. 
There could be three reasons for economic success by the au-
thoritarian regime and the rather poor performance by the demo-
cratic government. First, the authoritarian government was able 
to keep labor costs low to make Korean products competitive in 
international markets. Moreover, former military leaders (e.g. 
PARK Chung-hee, CHUN Doo-whan, and ROH Tae-woo) em-
ployed technocrats to develop the economy. With the strong sup-
port of the leaders, technocrats designed policies to develop the 
economy. However, civilian leaders (e.g KIM Young-sam, KIM 
Dae-jung, and ROH Moo-hyun) largely appointed their political al-
lies and supporters to government posts. They used authorities to 
appoint cabinet posts to payback their political debt. Thus, political 
55. Samuel S. Huntington, The Third wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 267. 
56. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The 
Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review, Vol.88 (1994), pp. 
903-910; Yi Feng, "Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth," British Jour-
nal of Political Science, Vol. 27 (1997), pp. 391-418; Mancur Olson. "Dictatorship, De-
mocracy, and Development,'' American Political Science Review, Vol. 87 (1993), pp. 
567-576. 
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connections played a key role in their cabinet appointment, which 
often led to a problematic policy making. 
A second reason can be found in the presidential system in-
stalled after the transition to democracy, which does not allow the 
president to rerun for another term. Since the president does not 
have to worry about the next term, shortsighted policies tend to be 
adopted as long as they are good for the short-term. A great exam-
ple of this practice is the KIM Dae-jung administration's campaign 
to increase credit card usage to promote private consumption to 
stimulate the economy. It helped the Korean economy to recover 
from the 1997 financial crisis, but credit card debt became a serious 
social problem during the ROH Moo-hyun administration period. 
This problem tends to appear in every presidential system regard-
less of term limits. 
Third and finally, civilian presidents, particularly Presidents 
KIM Dae-jung and ROH Moo-hyun adopted pro-labor policies and 
increased social welfare expenditures through tax increase. The ob-
jective of these policies were to reduce the gap between the rich 
and the poor, but the outcome of the policies was the departure of 
corporate capital to foreign countries and an aggravation of the 
wealth gap due to increased unemployment. In other words, the 
redistribution-oriented policies not only hindered growth, but also 
aggravated the wealth inequity between classes. 
The experience of South Korea's political and economic devel-
opment summarized above, has important policy implications and 
provides lessons for other developing countries. It is common in 
newly democratized countries for the government to adopt policies 
emphasizing wealth redistribution in attempts to attract more sup-
port from the poorer classes. As in the South Korean case, how-
ever, redistribution-oriented economic policies tend to yield 
economic struggles, at least in the short-term. Thus, newly elected 
democratic leaders need to be cautious in their policy decisions. 
Another lesson drawn from the South Korean example is that 
the transition to democracy does not result in immediate economic 
growth. Instead, democratization requires consolidation, which in-
volves institutionalization of the political and economic systems. In 
the process, previously dispersed interest groups as well as organ-
ized groups begin to aggregate and articulate their interest, which 
sometimes creates political instability. Thus, the rate at which dem-
ocratic and economic systems institutionalize is of critical impor-
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tance for economic performance after democratization because the 
maturity of institutions will play a critical role in policy making and 
implementation. 
